Ohio University Boeings 737 Max An Engineering Horror Story Paper

Boeing’s 737 Max: An Engineering Horror Story

Until a short time ago, the name ‘Boeing’ was stellar.The multi-national company which designs, manufactures and sells airplanes, rockets, satellites, missiles, rotorcraft and telecommunications equipment throughout the world was a leading source of engineering and manufacturing pride for the United States. Upon graduation, most engineering students would have been pleased to work for Boeing. The corporation was lauded for its engineering and scientific innovations, its large workforce and its business acumen. Based on its 2018 revenue, the company was among the largest aerospace manufacturers and was the fifth largest defense contractor in the world (Gates, 2020).

Then a fatal flaw came to light.On October 29, 2018 Indonesian airline Lion Air Flight 610 plunged into the Java Sea, killing all 189 individuals on board the Boeing 737 MAX. Initially, pilot error and inexperience were given as causes of the crash. However, Boeing engineers immediately began to study computer and software flaws that may have caused the crash. On March 10, 2019, only five months after the Lion Air disaster, 157 individuals perished when Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed. 346 individuals were dead, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Boeing investigators directly looked beyond pilot error and began focusing on engineering design problems in the Boeing 737 MAX. One flaw that caught their attention was something Boeing was managing to keep under the radar– the 737 MAX’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). In the two deadly crashes the MCAS automatically and repeatedly forced the aircraft to nosedive shortly after takeoff (MacGillis, 2019). Boeing knew of this problem but believed that any pilot could make a quick manual adjustment to save the aircraft if the sensors were malfunctioning. So, they omitted placing information in the pilots’ operations’ manual about the deadly feature and how to recover the aircraft if the sensors malfunctioned (Zhang, 2019; Langewiesche, 2019; Pasztor, 2019).They had also omitted most simulator training for the 737 MAX pilots.The planes went down because the new mechanisms kept detecting imminent stalls (in a stall the plane’s nose is pointing too far up) and correcting for the stalls by pointing the plane’s nose down, toward earth or sea, as it turned out.If the pilot could not stop that process, and later work showed that it could be very hard to do, the plane would crash. Boeing engineers had introduced a new and tricky mechanism, and in effect made sure that pilots would not know how to defeat it (Tkacik, 1019).

In both crashes, the FAA and Boeing found the MCAS to be the problem but also did not rule out pilot error (MacGillis, 2019).In fact, by November of 2018, Boeing was attempting to redesign the MCAS. In the meantime, the FAA and Boeing sent urgent messages to airlines to emphasize a flight recover procedure should the MCAS malfunction (Gates, 2019).In the meantime, additional problems have surfaced since the grounding of the 737 MAX. First, an additional software problem prevents the flight control computers from being turned on. The second problem involves sets of wire bundles on the plane in close proximity to one another, including in the electrical bay under the cockpit. An electrical short in any of these bundles could be devastating.It is not known when or if the Boeing 737 Max will be returned to service, creating a huge financial burden for Boeing. Gregory Travis, a software engineer and pilot who has written extensively about the crashes explains:

The Boeing 737 MAX has been in the news because of two crashes, practically back to back and involving brand new airplanes. In an industry that relies more than anything on the appearance of total control, total safety, these two crashes pose as close to an existential risk as you can get. Though airliner passenger death rates have fallen over the decades, that achievement is no reason for complacency. (Travis, 2019)

Internal memos indicate that Boeing had known of problems with the 737 Max since 2015.Emails between engineers and between pilots express uncertainty in the safety of the plane.An email from 2016 states. “This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys.” (Pinson, 2020) Another e-mail questions, “would you want your family to fly on a 737 Max?I wouldn’t.” (Pinson, 2020).Boeing had been urged to build a new plane rather than continuing to update the popular 737.Rather than building a new aircraft, Boeing decided to modify the latest generation of the 737 family, the 737NG.Boeing planned to install larger, more fuel-efficient engines.These created a serious problem.The MAX engines were larger than the 737 engines, and in order to provide appropriate ground clearance, they had to be mounter higher and further forward on the wings. This significantly changed the aerodynamics of the aircraft, thus necessitating the flawed MCAS system (Travis 2019; Glanz et al. 2019; Herkert et al 2020).

Boeing’s actions require they publicly address how they built at least one line of 737 planes that is unsafe – the 737 MAX – and explain what changes it will make for the future of this doomed aircraft.Boeing’s work culture requires trust, coordination, strong problem-solving, open flow of information and commitment to the overall success of the program. The culture of this manufacturing giant needs a shift to focus on design and engineering excellence rather than stock price.

• What do you take to be the issues this case raises?
• What do you take to be the ethical issues in this case?
• Explain the Boeing 737 Max case from the perspective of being the result of possible failures of the four functions of management—planning, organizing, leading, and controlling.
• Imagine yourself working as a Boeing software engineer.You discover design flaws within the MAX’s flight control software system designed to prevent stalls. Executives tell you to overlook this as the plane needs to be on the market now. You are part of a team testing of the 737 Max prior to its release.There is a lack of transparency about the new MCAS software. You don’t believe the aircraft can be released as it is currently engineered.There are already numerous advance orders for this plane, and management is pressuring you to overlook the software problem.They tell you that if a pilot can fly a 737, they can fly the MAX.You know this isn’t true.What should you do? In deciding what to do, explain the reasoning behind your decision. [Come to some group consensus on the answer to this question and present to group’s response.]
• What managerial initiatives and actions might have prevented the flawed release of the 737 Max?